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ABSTRACT 
International business (IB) research is traditionally heavily reliant on economics. In this 
paper, we review selected debates in the philosophy of science of economics and consider 
their relevance for economics-based IB research, given important characteristics of IB such 
as phenomenon-orientedness, concern with data and facts, and limited use of formal 
mathematical models and unrealistic assumptions in the analysis. We argue that, like in the 
case of mainstream economics, Lakatos’ concept of scientific research programmes (SRP) is 
more useful for understanding the philosophy of science of economics-based IB than Popper’s 
falsificationism. Following this, we discuss characteristics of two possible IB SRPs; 
Internalization theory and Dunning’s OLI paradigm. Finally, we discuss the approach to 
modelling in IB, finding it to reflect a relative commitment to scientific realism.  
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INTRODUCTION 
International business (IB) research has largely relied on existing theories such as transaction 
cost economics and institutional theory (Doz, 2011), to the extent of being “an appendage of 
economics, psychology, sociology and related management disciplines” (Devinney, Pedersen, 
& Tihanyi, 2010, p. 35). Of these ancestor disciplines, economics has traditionally dominated 
IB thought, particularly when it comes to firm behaviour (Toyne & Nigh, 1997a, p. 177); and 
for Buckley, IB is simply “a branch of applied economics” (Buckley, 1996, p. 8). The 
foundations of IB include the works of economists such as Buckley and Casson (1976), 
Hennart (1982), Hymer (1960/1976), McManus (1972), Rugman (1981), Caves (1996) and 
Dunning (1980). A question, then, is whether the philosophy of science of IB is simply 
inherited from economics; or whether there is something about the IB context and application 
of economics which makes it distinct from a philosophy of science point of view. Adapting 
Sullivan’s (1998) metaphor, what is the relative importance of the “genes” and the distinct 
“environment” of IB? 
In contrast to the little attention to such issues in IB (Toyne & Nigh, 1997b),1 extensive 
philosophy of science debates have taken place in economics over the last decades, 
concerning inter alia the applicability of the ideas of Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos to economics; 
the philosophical implications of (mathematical) modelling, as well as scientific realism and 
critical realism. The basic premise for this paper is that given the important role of economics 
in much IB scholarship, studying the philosophy of science of economics may aid IB scholars 
in better understanding the philosophy of science issues surrounding their own work. In 
Toyne’s words (1997, p. 630): 
To the extent that we [as IB scholars] are dependent on the ontological and 
epistemological assumptions, paradigms, theories and constructs of the social sciences 
and the business disciplines, we must be sensitive to the philosophy of science debate 
that is occurring in these fields, and to the implications that this debate has for our 
work. 
As Toyne’s remarks suggest, an important part of our task is to investigate more closely how 
economics is used in IB research, and what are the philosophy of science implications of this 
                                                          
1 Certainly, several IB authors have noted a positivistic focus in much IB research (Birkinshaw, Brannen, & 
Tung, 2011). Some IB scholars describe themselves mainly as economists (Boddewyn, 1997). Overall, the issue 
of a distinct IB ontology and epistemology appears so far to have proven elusive (Sullivan, 1998; Toyne & Nigh, 
1997b). 
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usage. Some of the characteristics of the IB breed of economics that spring to mind are the 
following. First, it is often noted that IB is traditionally an empirically driven or phenomenon-
oriented field, while much economics research has been criticized for a perceived lack of 
connection with the real world. IB has also been related to important policy issues. Sometimes, 
distinct IB contributions have arisen from omissions in economics, such as a lack of a proper 
theory of the multinational enterprise (MNE) (Devinney, et al., 2010). IB also generally 
involves less use of formal mathematical modelling, and of the idealizing and unrealistic 
assumptions often associated with economics. To foreshadow an argument to be developed 
and qualified below, an IB scholar would less likely subscribe to economist Milton 
Friedman’s (1953/2008) view that the only way to judge a theory is by looking at whether it 
gives correct predictions or not, and that descriptively false assumptions are, if anything, a 
virtue of a theory. Though IB theory certainly also makes important simplifications (Hashai, 
Asmussen, Benito, & Petersen, 2010), attention to data and context has always been an 
important ingredient in IB research (Buckley & Casson, 2003).  
This may have implications for the philosophy of science of IB. First, one may ask whether 
the greater empirical focus of IB implies a greater weight on falsificationism, i.e. the idea that 
science is characterized by developing theories that are empirically refutable (Popper, 1959); 
or a greater emphasis on scientific realism. On the other hand, given IB’s reliance on 
economics, one may ask to what extent IB economics is distinct from the economics scientific 
research programme (SRP) in Lakatos’ (1970) terms; i.e., whether IB is simply part of the 
protective belt of auxiliary hypotheses around the hard core of assumptions on maximization 
and equilibrium in the economics SRP. One might also inquire about the status of the 
dominant analytical framework for IB, Dunning’s eclectic paradigm (Dunning & Lundan, 
2008), as an IB SRP. These are among the questions that will be discussed in this paper. 
Our method is essentially indirect. We start in the next section with a brief and inevitably 
simplified description of the philosophy of science of economics. Since we largely attempt to 
infer IB’s philosophy of science from its practice, we must also consider how actual 
economics practice reflects official economics methodology. Only by doing so can we try to 
ensure that we are in fact comparing apples to apples, rather than to idealized apples. Based 
on the insights from this discussion, we turn in the following section to the main contribution 
of this paper, which is an analysis of the distinct characteristics of IB economics and its 
“revealed” philosophy of science. Much previous discussion related to the philosophy of 
science of IB has concerned what exactly is the domain of IB research (Toyne & Nigh, 1998; 
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Toyne & Nigh, 1997b). Here, we partly bypass this challenging issue by restricting our scope 
to a specific set of IB studies: We focus on the research descending most directly from 
economics and related to MNEs and international production; i.e. that relating to the 
internalization school and transaction cost economics, as well as the economics-based 
paradigm of Dunning (representative works include Buckley & Casson, 1976; Dunning, 1980, 
1988; Dunning & Lundan, 2008; Gatignon & Anderson, 1988; Hennart, 1982, 2000; Rugman, 
1981). We will not focus on the Uppsala internationalization school (Johanson & Vahlne, 
1977) and more or less closely related work (Aharoni, 1966, 2010; Aharoni, Tihanyi, & 
Connelly, 2011; Buckley, Devinney, & Louviere, 2007; Perlmutter, 1969); some references to 
these streams will however be made as we go along.2 Nevertheless, we remain firmly within 
some attempted definitions of the core issues of IB, such as Hennart’s (2010, p. 257) 
according to which “IB scholars study the governance of interdependencies between 
individuals located in different countries, and hence separated by geographic, institutional and 
cultural distance”. In a final concluding section, we summarize and discuss our findings and 
suggest some directions for further work. 
While our limited scope implies that we can only give a partial view on the philosophy of 
science of IB, it is an important view given the central role of economics and rationality-based 
perspectives in IB. The interest of such an analysis is further heightened by proposals that the 
economic principle of maximization be a unifying assumption for a general IB theory (Casson, 
1997). There is indeed a divide in IB research between rationalist theory/economics scholars 
lamenting a loss of parsimony by moving from a “positivistic” to a “multidisciplinary” 
approach on the one hand (Buckley & Casson, 2003, p. 222), and those that object to the 
dominance of rationality-based research in IB or at least wish to see it complemented by 
insights from “behavioural” theories and a greater focus on managerial decision-making on 
the other hand (Aharoni, 2010; Brouthers & Hennart, 2007).  
 
                                                          
2 It is perhaps also worth pointing out that we do not consider here the standard general equilibrium economics 
approach to MNEs, though this literature is also increasingly concerned with firm heterogeneity (e.g. Helpman, 
2006; Helpman, Melitz, & Yeaple, 2004). The prospect for a (re)integration of the mainstream economics 
approach to the MNE with IB economics would be an interesting issue for future work. 
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A BRIEF TOUR OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF ECONOMICS 
A brief exposition of economics 
Most economics textbooks start with some version of Lionel Robbins’ definition of 
economics as “the science which studies human behaviour as a relationship between ends and 
scarce means which have alternative uses” (1932/2008, p. 75). While the main object of study 
is obviously markets of various types, it is often argued that economics is above all a distinct 
method based on a set of core principles that can be applied to a wide range of issues (Casson, 
1997). Thus, for example, for Becker (1978, p. 5) the heart of the economic approach is “[t]he 
combined assumptions of maximizing behaviour, market equilibrium and stable preferences, 
used relentlessly and unflinchingly”.3 As is well known, formal mathematical modelling and 
quantitative statistical (econometric) analysis also play a key role in most economic research. 
Exaggerating somewhat, the philosophical self-image of economics is that of a “genuine 
science” based on deduction and developing refutable implications (Lazear, 2000, p. 99). 
Indeed, the ideal for economics is traditionally the physical sciences, with core concepts such 
as equilibrium borrowed from physics. 
This image is, of course, too simple. Though economics has been relatively slow to pick up on 
philosophy of science debates in natural sciences (Beed, 1991), an extensive literature has 
explored issues of philosophy of science in economics. Economics in fact has a long 
methodological tradition going back to at least to the 19th century (Blaug, 1980). Until about 
the 1960s, the scattered discussions of economic methodology were, however, largely centred 
around the views of certain prominent economists (Backhouse, 2012). One view that has 
remained influential is that of Milton Friedman, whose essay, The methodology of positive 
economics (1953/2008), has been argued to capture many economists’ intuition about their 
field. Friedman famously argued that the only4 way to test economic theories is to compare 
their predictions with reality and that unrealistic assumptions are, if anything, a virtue of a 
theory. The following passage from the essay is probably one of the most quoted or 
paraphrased in economic methodology (1953/2008, p. 218): 
                                                          
3 It is worth emphasising that rationality is a more fundamental assumption than the self-interest assumption 
commonly associated with economics (Angner & Loewenstein, 2012). Rationality in economics is understood 
instrumentally as how individuals’ actions promote their goals (Torsvik, 2005); or put differently, rationality is 
expressed in “the maximisation assumption” that “[f]or all decision makers there is something they maximize” 
(Boland, 1981, p. 1034) 
4 “Mainly” would be more accurate, as Friedman’s essay has more nuances than we can provide here. Entire 
essays could be (and, indeed, have been) written about possible interpretations (Mayer, 1993). 
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Truly important and significant hypotheses will be found to have “assumptions” that 
are wildly inaccurate descriptive representations of reality, and, in general, the more 
significant the theory, the more unrealistic the assumptions (in this sense). 
For Friedman, it is important to distinguish the assumptions of a theory from the phenomena 
which the theory is intended to explain. Though the assumptions may also be compared with 
reality, it is the comparison of the predictions with reality that matters. Friedman famously 
gives the example of predicting the shots made by an expert billiard player, proposing that 
excellent predictions would be yielded by the hypothesis that the billiard player made 
his shots as if he knew the complicated mathematical formulas that would give the 
optimum directions of travel, could estimate accurately by eye the angles, etc., 
describing the location of the balls, could make lightning calculations from the 
formulas, and could then make the balls travel in the direction indicated by the 
formulas (1953/2008, p. 222, emphasis in original). 
By analogy, Friedman hypothesises that firms behave as if they were rationally seeking to 
maximize expected returns, having full knowledge of all necessary data (i.e., that they 
perfectly know all the relevant cost and demand functions, are able to calculate marginal 
revenue and cost, and choose actions equating these). Of course, this is not a realistic 
description of business managers any more than the preceding was of billiard players. For 
Friedman, however, the point is that a model with these unrealistic assumptions may 
nevertheless give good predictions; and predictions are what matter for judging a theory. Not 
all economists agreed with Friedman. One objection is that one does not only want theories to 
predict, but also to explain (Blaug, 1980). In any case, Friedman’s view provides a useful 
frame of reference for the following discussion. For one thing, it lends itself to a variety of 
interpretations. The focus on empirical predictions has been interpreted both in terms of 
verificationism and falsificationism; and the issue of realisticness of assumptions is closely 
related to modelling and to the issue of scientific realism versus instrumentalism (Hanisch, 
2003). On the other hand, the prominent role given to maximization can be linked to the 
question of paradigmatic features (in Kuhn’s sense) and scientific research programmes (in 
Lakatos’ sense) in economics. We explore these issues below. 
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Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos and the rise of the economic methodology field 
It was not until the 1970s that economic methodology emerged as a distinct field. The 
following decades witnessed lively debates on the role of falsification in economics, and on 
whether economics could be understood in terms of Lakatos’ scientific research programmes 
(Backhouse, 2012). 5 As is well known, Popper (1959) replaced the principle of verifiability 
of the logical positivists with the principle of falsifiability as the demarcation criterion for 
science;6 arguing there can be no logic of proof; only one of disproof. Thus, for a theory to 
qualify as science, it must be made clear what observations would refute the theory. In 
particular, Popper criticized the use of “immunizing strategies”; i.e., ad hoc modifications to a 
theory in order to accommodate contradictory empirical evidence. Popper’s views have 
resonated strongly with economists. However, it has been argued that despite official rhetoric, 
falsificationism is little practiced (Blaug, 1980; McCloskey, 1983). Blaug (1984, p. 375) 
argues that “the central weakness of modern economics is in fact the reluctance to produce 
theories which yield unambiguously refutable implications”. Now, few economists believe 
that economic theory does not need to be tested empirically. Certainly, “[t]here is a great deal 
amount of empirical activity in economics, the facts do matter, but they matter in a much 
more subtle and complex way than falsificationism allows” (Hands, 1993, p. 68). 
Indeed, falsificationism demands more than simply showing the theory to be consistent with 
evidence. As Hands (1993, p. 62) puts it, the falsificationist “proposes a bold conjecture” 
which is then “severely tested by comparing its least likely consequences with the relevant 
empirical data”. Blaug (1984, p. 376) goes as far as arguing that “economists spend much of 
their time showing that the real world bears out their predictions, thus replacing 
falsificationism, which is difficult, with confirmation, which is easy”. Through a series of 
“case studies”, Blaug (1980) argues persuasively that falsificationism does not have top 
priority in economic research. A prime example of this is the theoretical general equilibrium 
analysis programme, concerned in particular with the conditions for the existence of 
equilibrium. It hardly needs to be argued that falsificationism is not the main driving force 
behind this research. 
                                                          
5 Few economists have, however, embraced the total relativism of e.g. Feyerabend (1975). 
6 A naïve version of falsificationism would seem to suggest that a single empirical refutation means scientists 
should abandon it. Of course, this is inappropriate inter alia because many implications, not least in the social 
sciences, are stochastic; a theory must be repeatedly refuted before it can be said to be falsified (Blaug, 1984). 
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Next, taking an example from international trade theory, Blaug shows how the apparent 
refutation of the Hecksher-Ohlin theorem (HOT) by Leontief’s (1953) finding that US trade 
patterns (i.e., exporting labour-intensive goods and importing capital-intensive goods) were 
the opposite of what the theory would predict (the Leontief paradox) led few trade economists 
to abandon the theory.7 For these economists, “the factual accuracy of the HOT was a minor 
question because it was regarded anyway as only the first approximation to the real-world 
conditions of different taxes, tariffs, transport costs, economies of scale, demand conditions, 
factor mobilities and imperfections of competition” (1980, p. 211). Economists continued 
refining the theory, addressing puzzles raised by the Leontief paradox such as what a factor is 
and the implications of including multiple factors. Finally, discussing Becker’s work on the 
economics of the family (an often cited example of “economic imperialism”) Blaug (1980) 
starts by commending Becker’s announcement of a falsificationist approach by among others 
assuming stable preferences: The rationale being, of course, that if preferences were allowed 
to change, they could always be invoked in an ad hoc manner to explain deviations from the 
theory’s predictions. On the other hand, Blaug argues that these studies are, in practice, 
essentially concerned with verification; taking a real-life feature previously not studied by 
economists, and showing that it can be explained by the economic approach. What these 
studies do not do is predict novel facts that the theory was not originally designed to explain. 
Neither is the economic approach explicitly tested vis-à-vis alternative theories taken; e.g., 
from sociology or anthropology. Popper indeed noted that when testing one theory, we 
usually have an alternative “up our sleeves”, and “the falsifying experiment is usually a 
crucial experiment designed to decide between the two” (Popper, 1959, p. 87n). Such tests are 
rarely found in economics.8  
If falsificationism is not widely practised, there may be good reasons for this. Falsification is 
problematic even in principle following the Duhem-Quine thesis (Quine, 1953) that one can 
never conclusively falsify a single hypothesis, since it is always tested in conjunction with 
various auxiliary hypotheses (including hypotheses on observation), and we cannot know 
which hypothesis is responsible for the empirical disconfirmation. Strong auxiliary 
hypotheses are, of course, an important part of economics (Blaug, 1980; Hands, 1993); some 
of these are even infalsifiable (e.g., eventually diminishing returns). Furthermore, 
                                                          
7 The HOT states that a country will export those goods whose production is intensive in the country’s relatively 
abundant production factor, and import those goods whose production is intensive in the country’s relatively 
scarce factor. This is a clear empirical implication which may be refuted. 
8 Even explicit tests of competing economic theories are rare. For one honourable exception, see Markusen and 
Maskus (2003) who explicitly attempt to discriminate between alternative economic theories of FDI. 
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mathematical modelling often requires a number of assumptions to ensure tractability, such as 
constant returns to scale. Any one of these hypotheses may be the culprit in the case of 
empirical refutation. On the other hand, failing to find empirical support for an economic 
theory will lead few economists to question the basic assumptions of individual maximization 
and equilibrium. Indeed, as noted by Casson (1997, p. 185), “[t]he assumption of optimization 
is essentially immune to refutation. By itself it implies nothing. It is only when combined with 
assumptions about preferences and constraints that it yields predictions.” This is clearly at 
odds with falsificationism: “immunizing any part of scientific theory would be in conflict with 
Popper’s falsificationist method of bold conjecture and severe test” (Hands, 1993, p. 67).
  
This suggests that economics is better understood in terms of the work of Kuhn and Lakatos 
than that of Popper.9 Kuhn (1962) showed that Popper’s account of science did not reflect 
actual scientific practice: Scientists do not readily cast away theories following apparent 
disconfirmations, and fortunately so. Instead, Kuhn described normal science taking place 
within paradigms, consisting of “the general theoretical assumptions and laws and techniques 
for their application that the members of a particular scientific community adopt” (Chalmers, 
1999, p. 108). Working within a paradigm allows scientists to refine their theories and 
methods, conduct experiments, etc., while taking their foundations as given. However, a 
paradigm will inevitably encounter anomalies it cannot explain. When these become serious 
enough, the paradigm will face a crisis, in particular if there is a new competing paradigm 
which can account for the anomalies. At some point, the change to a new and essentially 
incompatible paradigm takes place via a scientific revolution. Kuhn argues, however, that this 
change cannot be made on strictly objective grounds and will to some extent involve a “leap 
of faith”, for two main reasons (Okasha, 2002). First, there is incommensurability related to 
the lack of a common theoretical language or framework with which to compare competing 
paradigms. Second, the idea of theory-ladenness of data implies that data are inevitably 
                                                          
9 It is here interesting to note another, less well known part of Popper’s work, namely the method of situational 
analysis which he designed specifically for the social sciences (Hands, 1985). Here, Popper suggested that the 
postulate of rationality (the rationality principle) should always be maintained, and one should attempt to find 
explanations for social behaviour in terms of the “situation” in the situation in which the agents find themselves 
(the concept of situation also includes the actors’ goals). When facing empirical refutation, the assumption 
should always be that the situation has not been specified correctly. This is clearly analogous to the 
maximization assumption, and indeed, Popper referred to this as the economic method. We will not here dwell 
on the issue of whether there is an inconsistency in Popper’s work in this respect (see Hands, 1985).  
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“contaminated” by theory, and that there are therefore no theory-independent data which 
could be used to decide between the theories.10 
 
Coats (1969, p. 292) argues that despite some heterodoxy, “economics has been dominated 
throughout its history by a single paradigm – the theory of economic equilibrium via the 
market mechanism”. Nevertheless, Coats (1969) argues that the Keynesian revolution was a 
paradigm shift. John Maynard Keynes departed from the principle of methodological 
individualism, as the consumption function was not derived from individual maximizing 
behaviour (Blaug, 1984). Keynes also allowed for persistent disequilibrium in the labour 
market (or more precisely an “underemployment equilibrium”; which did not fit with the idea 
that markets would always work to ensure equilibrium).  
The question raised by Kuhn’s work was whether one can really speak about scientific 
progress at all. Lakatos’ (1970) answer to the dual limitations of Popper’s falsificationism and 
Kuhn’s relativism (Chalmers, 1999) was to suggest that scientific research programmes (SRPs) 
rather than individual theories are the appropriate units of appraisal for scientific progress; 
and that some parts of an SRP are more fundamental than others. According to Lakatos, SRPs 
consist on the one hand of a hard core of unquestioned fundamental metaphysical 
assumptions; and on the other hand a protective belt of more peripheral assumptions that may 
be allowed to be falsified. The SRP thus provides systematic guidelines (which are missing in 
falsificationism) for which hypotheses should be modified following empirical 
disconfirmation. Finally, Lakatos described positive and negative heuristics relating to the 
“do’s” and “don’ts” in terms of how research should be conducted within the SRP.  The 
negative heuristic is primarily about protecting the hard core by making all adjustments in the 
protective belt. In contrast, the positive heuristic provides a forward-looking component and 
[c]onsists of a partially articulated set of suggestions or hints on how to change, 
develop the “refutable variants” of the research programme, how to modify, 
sophisticate, the “refutable” protective belt (Lakatos, 1970, p. 135) 
One important characteristic of the positive heuristic is that it can also anticipate what kinds 
of refutations will be met during the development of the programme; and indeed it “forges 
                                                          
10 Of course, both these ideas are exaggerated (Chalmers, 1999). It is, however, notable that some of the data of 
economics depends on the eye of the beholder (Hands 1993 gives the example of “involuntary unemployment”). 
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ahead with almost complete disregard of ‘refutations’”; while it is the “verifications” that 
“provide the contact point with reality” (1970, p. 137). 
It is not surprising that economic methodologists picked up on Lakatos’ ideas. Indeed, 
Lakatos specifically referred to economics and argued that strict falsificationism would imply 
throwing out all budding social science theories, without necessarily having good alternatives; 
programs need time for development in order to achieve their potential, before being fully 
confronted with the data (Chalmers, 1999). Thus,  following criticism that general equilibrium 
analysis (GEA) is unfalsifiable, Weintraub (1985) recast it as an SRP involving six hard core 
propositions: “HCl, There exist economic agents; HC2, Agents have preferences over 
outcomes; HC3, Agents independently optimize subject to constraints; HC4, Choices are 
made in interrelated markets; HC5, Agents have full relevant knowledge, and; HC6, 
Observable economic outcomes are coordinated, so they must be discussed with reference to 
equilibrium states” (1985, p. 109).11 The protective belt on its hand consists of GEA’s actual 
theories, auxiliary hypotheses, empirical methods, etc.; in practice covering most of applied 
microeconomics (Hands, 1993, p. 67). Similarly, Latsis formulated four hard core 
assumptions of the neoclassical theory of the firm SRP: (i) Profit maximization; (ii) Perfect 
knowledge; (iii) Independence of decisions; and (iv) Perfect markets (Latsis, 1972, p. 209). 
Importantly, any question about the realism of such hard core assumptions fails to recognize 
their role in the methodology of the SRP (Blaug, 1980). On the other hand, questions relating 
to the protective belt are perfectly legitimate; i.e. those relating to the realism of auxiliary 
assumptions that determine the applicability of the theory, such as homogenous products, 
“large” numbers of firms, and free entry and exit (Latsis, 1972; Blaug, 1980). 
What then about the important question of scientific progress in Lakatos’ setup; and how does 
economics perform on this account? For Lakatos, an SRP is progressive when it is able to 
remain coherent and at the same time is able to predict “novel facts” that competing programs 
cannot. On the other hand, “if and when the programme ceases to anticipate novel facts, its 
hard core might have to be abandoned” (Lakatos, 1970, p. 134). Not surprisingly, economists 
have disagreed on whether specific economic SRPs such as the general equilibrium 
                                                          
11 This and the following example are only given to provide a flavour of how economic methodologists have 
applied Lakatos’ ideas. Indeed, economists have suggested a variety of different SRPs with different hard cores 
(Caldwell, 1991).  
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programme are progressive or degenerating (Toruno, 1988). 12  Writing in 1991 Caldwell 
found “reason to doubt that there exist many examples of progressive research programmes in 
economics” (Caldwell, 1991, p. 100). While the details of such assessments might also be 
interesting for IB scholars (Toruno, 1988), we must here be content with one simple example. 
Considering the Keynesian revolution in an SRP framework, Blaug (1984) notes that it 
appeared progressive in the 1930s when it led to confirmed predictions that were surprising in 
terms of the prevailing framework at the time; in particular the role of government spending 
in moving the economy out of a recession through multiplier effects. On the other hand, the 
Keynesian program appeared to be degenerating in the 1970s when it could not account for 
stagflation (Caldwell, 1991); it was then superseded by an alternative SRP based on the idea 
of rational expectations.13 In general, the application of the SRP concept has been hampered 
by the fact that the idea of “novel facts” is somewhat unclear (Chalmers, 1999). 
Recent debates: Models and scientific realism 
In contemporary debates, Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos have faded into the background and new 
philosophical issues have been taken up (Backhouse, 2012; Hodge, 2008; Lawson, 1997); of 
which we will focus the issue of modelling and its relationship with scientific realism. These 
issues link back to Friedman’s view above and are an appropriate way to end our brief tour of 
the philosophy of science of economics. Critics often question whether much economics 
research has anything to do with reality at all (Mäki, 2012). Indeed, economists are somewhat 
self-conscious about this as illustrated by the following quote from Klamer and Colander 
(1990, p. 19; cited in Røgeberg and Nordberg, 2005) 
‘Of course this assumption is absurd,’ a well-known economist noted during a recent 
seminar, ‘but hey, isn’t all we do absurd and utterly unrealistic?’ People laughed, and 
he continued solving the model. 
One could ask whether scientific realism is even relevant for the social sciences. According to 
standard definitions from a natural science context, scientific realism “holds that the physical 
world exists independently of human thought and perception.” (Okasha, 2002, p. 58). That is, 
under the standard definition of scientific realism the item under study is not dependent on 
                                                          
12 It would lead us too far to discuss the scientific progress of general equilibrium theory as an SRP here; it is 
nevertheless interesting to note that the purely theoretical GE programme seems to have been more or less 
abandoned by economists, following disappointing results (Katzner, 2010; Kirman, 1989). 
13 Keynesian and Post-Keynesian SRPs still co-exist with the neoclassical perspective, and are cited as examples 
of competing SRPs (e.g., Toruno, 1988). 
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human minds for its existence, which obviously does not fit for e.g. money, central banks and 
firms. To accommodate such phenomena, Mäki (2012) proposes a minimal scientific realism, 
where one important change is replacing the criterion of mind-independency with science-
independency. Now, how can social reality be independent of economics, given that economic 
theories clearly affect both practice (Black-Scholes formula) and ideology? Or consider the 
claim that economics and business students act more self-interestedly (Hellmich, 2012).14 
Here, Mäki (2012, p. 21) argues that economics may well change the beliefs and motives of 
actors, but is not directly constitutive of these practices, and that in this sense it does not 
directly affect economic reality. 15  The question of realism (or better: realisticness) of 
assumptions continues to provide food for debate for economists and their critics (Mäki, 
2012). According to the instrumentalist view, some types of theoretical entities can be 
regarded as “convenient fictions” (Okasha, 2002) that may allow good predictions to be made 
(we recognize Friedman’s ideas here). In contrast, realists maintain that scientists should also 
aim to discover “truths” and explain phenomena (Hausman, 2008). Not all methodologists 
accept a direct link between realism in assumptions and scientific realism, however. For 
example, Mäki (2012) sees unrealistic assumptions as perfectly compatible with (a suitable 
version of) scientific realism; indeed, “unrealistic assumptions can even be the very means for 
striving for the truth” (Morgan & Knuuttila, 2012, p. 53). Thus, “when an economist makes 
unrealistic assumptions [...] she is deliberately employing strategic falsehoods in order to 
attain some epistemic and pragmatic gains. This is the point of idealization” (Mäki, 2012, p. 
10). 
Unrealistic assumptions are often linked to (mathematical) models, and some insights on the 
relationship of these models to realism can be gained by considering different approaches to 
modelling. Morgan and Knuuttila (2012) discuss two different views of models as 
idealizations or constructions/fictions. Idealization is “typically portrayed as a process that 
starts with the complicated world with the aim of simplifying it and isolating a small part of it 
for model representation” (2012, p. 51). In this view, models are used to abstract “causally 
relevant capacities or factors of the real world for the purpose of working out deductively 
what effects those few isolated capacities or factors have in particular model (i.e., controlled) 
environments” (2012, p. 52), and is essentially about capturing “only those core causal factors, 
                                                          
14 Cf. also the argument by Ghoshal and Moran (1996) that the opportunism postulate of transaction cost 
economics (TCE) negatively affects behaviour and that TCE therefore is “bad for practice”. 
15 In addition, some theories cannot have such an effect; for example assuming that people are perfectly rational 
does not make them so. 
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capacities or essentials of a causal mechanism that bring about a certain target phenomenon” 
(2012, p. 53). Walliser (2002) describes modelling in terms of reasoning on a sub-system 
represented in a simplified manner, isolating what the researcher believes to be the most 
salient aspects. The sub-system is isolated from its environment by assuming that the 
environment stays constant or by neglecting it altogether. One function of false idealizing 
assumptions is then to “help implement theoretical isolations in a controlled manner” (Mäki, 
2012, p. 13); an analogy is often made with the physical controls of laboratory experiments 
(Morgan & Knuuttila, 2012).  
Important here is also the idea that by a process of de-idealization, as science progresses, one 
can reintroduce omitted elements, bringing the model closer to the real world. In fact, much 
economics work consists of introducing additional complications that have been disregarded 
in earlier, more simplified models. Thus, reversing idealizations can be conceptualized as 
moving towards greater realism. In practice, however, de-idealization may be difficult for 
many reasons (Morgan & Knuuttila, 2012). For example, some idealizations may have been 
motivated by mathematical tractability. Re-introducing excluded factors may also re-
introduce causal complexity in terms of non-separable causal relations that were previously 
assumed away. The upshot of these and several other similar issues is that it is not 
straightforward to move towards more realistic models through de-idealization. 
An alternative to the view that models abstract, isolate or idealize essential factors or 
mechanisms, is that they are rather “like pure constructions or fictional entities that 
nevertheless license different kinds of inferences” (Morgan & Knuuttila, 2012, p. 61). In this 
view, models are used mainly to facilitate communication of arguments (Walliser, 2002), and 
are more like caricatures designed to illuminate some feature of the situation (Gibbard & 
Varian, 1978) or fictions which “can give us some understanding of real economic 
mechanisms, even though they are not interpreted as representations of real target systems” 
(Morgan & Knuuttila, 2012, p. 62). Morgan and Knuuttila cite Machlup’s (1967, p. 9) claim 
that the neoclassical firm in traditional price theory is just a “theoretical link” which should 
not be confused with any real firm; as well as Lucas’ (1980, p. 697) argument that 
[o]ne of the functions of theoretical economics is to provide fully articulated, artificial 
economic systems that can serve as laboratories in which policies that would be 
prohibitively expensive to experiment with in actual economies can be tested out at 
much lower cost […] A “theory” is not a collection of assertions about the behavior of 
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the actual economy but rather an explicit set of instructions for building a parallel or 
analogue system – a mechanical, imitation economy. 
This fictional account of modelling contrasts with the realist account of among others Mäki 
(Morgan & Knuuttila, 2012). A limiting case of fictional models that have been labelled 
“absurd” models (Røgeberg, 2004; Røgeberg & Nordberg, 2005) helps make the point that 
models do not in all cases make claims to scientific realism. For example, in “rational 
addiction” models (Becker & Murphy, 1988), individuals are portrayed as rationally 
implementing an increasing consumption path of drugs. As interpreted by Røgeberg and 
Nordberg (2005), such models are not meant to be about anything real at all. Rather, given 
limited human cognitive abilities they are “a way to bundle facts and hypotheses in a form 
that exploits folk psychology”. As long as this is understood, Røgeberg and Nordberg see a 
useful function for such models; problems only arise when one draws inappropriate welfare or 
political implications (e.g., that one should not worry about drug addiction because the 
individuals are simply implementing their utility-maximizing path of drug consumption over 
time). Thus, caricatural models do not only idealize, but add new features (Morgan & 
Knuuttila, 2012), amounting to advanced story-telling or even rhetoric (McCloskey, 1983). 
 
ECONOMICS AND INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS RESEARCH 
(How) is the philosophy of science of economics relevant for IB? 
Our brief tour of the philosophy of science of economics raises several issues for economics-
based IB research. First, we have seen that given essentially infalsifiable methodological 
assumptions, Lakatos and Kuhn seem to be more relevant for understanding economics 
research than Popper’s falsificationism, in which any component of the theory is, in principle, 
in jeopardy.16 A question is to what extent the same is true for IB research descending from 
economics. There are some possible reasons why IB economists might be more committed to 
falsificationism than their colleagues in mainstream economics. Consider first the claim of 
Hennart (1997) that IB has had a strong policy focus. For example, the MNE posed important 
policy questions which were not answered by the trade theory existing at the time, and which 
necessitated the development of new theory (Hennart, 1997, p. 648). Convincing cases have 
                                                          
16 As pointed out in a footnote above, however, Popper suggested a specific methodology for the social sciences 
(situational analysis) which was very much in line with the economic approach. 
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been made for the importance of such “big questions” for IB research (Buckley, 2002). Or 
consider the statement relating to the neoclassical standard assumptions in economics that “IB 
scholars were better able to devise new theories because they were less reluctant to break 
these assumptions” (Hennart, 1997, p. 649). This suggests a greater willingness of IB 
economists to modify even the hard core.  
Another important characteristic of IB research is the focus on firm-level heterogeneity rather 
than the minimalistic conceptions of the firm in general equilibrium models (Markusen, 
2001).17 IB does not have general and purely theoretical programs such as the theoretical 
general equilibrium analysis program of mainstream economics which are continually refined, 
with little concern for empirical testing. Even the more abstract frameworks and models such 
as Buckley and Hashai (2004, p. 44), aim to “compare the predictions of a synthesised model 
with reality”. Compared to mainstream economics, there is also relatively little use of 
mathematical modelling in IB. To be sure, early internalization works such as Buckley and 
Casson (1976), Rugman (1981) and Hennart (1982) all contain mathematical models, as do a 
number of later studies (Asmussen, Benito, & Petersen, 2009; Buckley & Casson, 1981). But 
these models are (usually) limited to specific arguments rather than being a focus in the 
analysis. Apparently IB scholars in general are more reluctant to leave out important factors 
of the main analysis to facilitate tractability of models. Hennart (1997, p. 650) notes that 
“[t]he need to tackle real problems has [...] privileged relevance at the expense of elegance”. 
We now consider whether these traits mean that the conclusions regarding economics must be 
modified when considering economics-based IB research. 
Falsificationism and scientific research programmes in economics-based IB 
The first economics-based IB contributions were largely motivated by empirical facts which 
did not fit into existing theoretical frameworks. According to Hennart, “The concern of IB 
scholars with facts and data has often exposed the inadequacies of existing theories” (1997, p. 
645). Thus, Hymer (1960/1976) started with asking why a distinction is made between direct 
investment (involving control) and portfolio investment (not involving control), when this 
distinction was not reflected in the prevailing theory of foreign direct investment (FDI) which 
asserted that FDI, like portfolio investments, was driven by differences in interest rates 
                                                          
17 This does not mean that equilibrium does not play an important background role e.g. in internalization analysis. 
The following explicit statement is illustrative: “Our model can thus contribute to explain and predict the 
equilibrium size of firms across industries, between countries and through time” (Hennart 1982, p. 60). 
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between countries. Hymer went on to identify a number of problems with the interest-rate 
theory, summarizing its implausibility as follows: “if the investment is motivated by interest 
rates, it should move to some countries and all industries, and not, as is in fact the case, to 
some industries and to all countries” (1960/1976, p. 20). According to Hymer, the main 
shortcoming of the interest-rate theory was that it did not explain why a firm chooses to retain 
control over the investment object. As is well known, he went on to provide two explanations 
in terms of removing competition and appropriating the returns from firm-specific advantages; 
the latter establishing the idea that firm-specific advantages are a necessary condition for FDI 
to overcome liabilities of foreignness. Similarly, in their retrospective on The Future of The 
Multinational Enterprise (Buckley & Casson, 1976), Buckley and Casson (2003, p. 220) saw 
it as “distinguished by its strongly positivistic stance”, beginning by “summarizing the 
stylized facts revealed by the published statistics.” Hennart (1982) followed much of the same 
approach, describing stylized facts about FDI and pointing out the failures of various 
alternative theories to account for these facts. Hennart (1982, p. 26-27) then presented “a 
general model of the choice between firms and markets as organizational modes” which could 
account “for the industrial, geographical and historical patterns of foreign direct investment 
and for the ownership policies of multinational firms.” 
The question here, however, is not whether there has been empirical testing and whether the 
theories have been broadly corroborated, but whether economics-based IB scholars have gone 
the additional lengths required by falsificationism; and in particular whether they have been 
willing to subject all parts of a theory, including core assumptions, to potential falsification. 
The next question is, then, whether such stricter tests have been performed as IB theory has 
matured. Indeed, it has been noted that with the arrival of ambitious theories such as 
transaction cost economics (TCE) and the resource-based view, theory testing and predictive 
approaches have become more of a focus in IB from the 1980s onwards (Benito, Petersen, & 
Welch, 2012).  
Buckley’s (1988) discussion of empirical testing of the internalization theory (IT) of the MNE 
about a decade after The Future sheds some light on this. According to him, two general 
axioms underlying IT are that (1) Firms choose the least cost location for each activity they 
perform and (2) firms grow by internalizing markets up to the point where the benefits of 
further internalization are outweighed by the costs. Buckley refers to this general statement as 
“tautologous”, admitting that the general theory of the MNE cannot be tested directly. 
However, “restricting the theory […] by limiting the general propositions gives rise to a 
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number of special theories that have empirical content and can be tested” (1988, p. 182). 
Linking up to Williamson’s (1975) TCE, Buckley cites IB work showing that, as expected, 
“the incidence of transaction costs is particularly high in vertically integrated industries, 
knowledge-intensive industries, quality assurance-dependent products and communication-
intensive industries” (ibid).18  
Buckley also provides some suggestions as to what would refute IT. We here mention three: 
(1) a pattern of foreign direct investment contrary to the theory's predictions; (2) perfect 
diversification and risk avoidance, and (3) market entry behaviour at variance with predictions. 
Against (1), Buckley notes that “data shows that by industry and nationality there is 
conformity to the theory's predictions at the most general level.” (1988, p. 186). Against (2), 
he states that “we observe a concentration of foreign direct investment in advanced market 
economies where risk/return patterns exhibit close correlation one with another” (ibid.). 
Finally, discussing (3) he cites a theoretical model in Buckley and Casson (1981) predicting 
that “in an expanding market where two or more different modes of market servicing are used, 
foreign direct investment will never precede licensing, licensing will never precede exporting 
and foreign direct investment will never precede exporting”. Recognizing that there may be 
many ways that foreign market servicing can evolve, however, he adds that “tests must be 
formulated in a more rigorous way against data that are hard to obtain” (1988, p. 187).  
Again, however, these might not be strong enough tests of the theory from a falsificationist 
perspective. One way of testing a theory is directing it towards new questions that it was not 
originally developed to explain. Thus, IT and TCE19 have been applied to the questions of full 
or partial ownership in FDI (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986), greenfield investments versus 
acquisitions (Hennart & Park, 1993), strategic alliances (Chen & Chen, 2003), internal 
governance of MNEs (Buckley & Strange, 2011; Tomassen, et al., 2012), and de-
internationalization (Benito & Welch, 1997). One particularly important application of 
                                                          
18 Of course, as Buckley also points out, these works have not actually measured the transaction costs of 
hierarchical versus market modes. Some work attempting to measure such costs has emerged recently (Tomassen, 
Benito, & Lunnan, 2012). 
19 For the moment, we lump together IT and TCE-based works, though these were to some extent developed 
independently (Buckley & Casson, 1976; McManus, 1972; Williamson, 1975) and there are some important 
differences between these streams. According to Hennart (2007, p. 4), the core similarities between 
internalization theory (in two variants of Buckley & Casson 1976 and Hennart 1982, respectively) and TCE are: 
“(i) all three theories look at the MNE as one of many potential institutions set up to organize international 
interdependencies; (ii) they all assume that human agents are opportunistic and boundedly rational; (iii) they all 
argue that agents choose institutions that maximize the gains that can be derived from the transaction, and that 
the rents obtained when organizing the transaction by a given institution depend on the specific characteristics of 
the transaction”. Some differences relate to the role of asset specificity defined as relation-specific investments 
as opposed to information asymmetry (see, e.g., Brouthers & Hennart, 2007, p. 401).  
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TCE/IT has been in entry mode research; this research has certainly not been slowed down by 
somewhat mixed results (Brouthers & Hennart, 2007).20 IB researchers are not deterred by 
anomalies that apparently cast doubt on the TCE explanation. For example, while most of the 
predictions based on TCE are borne out empirically, Gatignon and Anderson (1988, see pp. 
309 and 323) do not find support for the core idea in TCE (Williamson, 1975, 1979) that in 
particular the interaction between uncertainty and asset specificity promotes control through 
ownership. Despite this, they emphasize the overall support for the TCE perspective.21 In fact, 
a lacking interaction effect is also found in other TCE-based studies e.g. in marketing (see 
John & Reve, 2010); and while TCE has allegedly received extensive empirical support, it is 
notable that few studies have even tested this crucial interaction effect predicted by 
Williamson’s theory either in entry mode research (Brouthers & Hennart, 2007) or more 
generally (Macher & Richman, 2008).  
Somewhat ironically, the celebrated paper of Kogut and Zander (1993) who posit an 
alternative explanation to TCE and IT for the MNE, illustrates these issues well. Kogut and 
Zander argue that the assumption of opportunism is superfluous to explain the existence of 
MNEs; MNEs are essentially social communities and “repositories of knowledge”, and MNEs 
are explained by the fact that tacit and less codifiable information is more easily transferred 
within such social communities, meaning it will be associated with control through ownership. 
Their argument leads to many of the same predictions as TCE-based arguments, and indeed, it 
is unclear how their empirical analysis can effectively separate between the two explanations: 
Less codifiable information might be exactly the information that is most difficult to protect 
through market-related arrangements (e.g., patents) or licensing, increasing the risk of 
opportunistic behaviour (Gatignon & Anderson, 1988). Essentially, Kogut and Zander’s (1993) 
empirical analysis can support both the TCE story and the repositories of knowledge story.22 
On one account, however, IB does appear to perform better according to Popper’s standards. 
Like most economics research, IB studies often fail to provide satisfactory tests to 
discriminate against competing approaches, and though IB as a field is multidisciplinary, 
individual contributions are rarely so (Doz, 2011). Nevertheless, exceptions exist. For 
                                                          
20 Though we cannot enter into details here, the differences between TCE and internalization theory may be of 
some importance for understanding these results (Brouthers & Hennart, 2007). 
21 More generally, this points to an interesting issue regarding articles that state a set of different predictions on 
the basis e.g. of TCE: If some hypotheses are supported and others not, to what extent can one say that the theory 
is really supported? Can one really speak in terms of some “average” support for the theory? 
22 Cf. also Brouthers and Hennart (2007) who find Kogut and Zander’s (1993) results consistent with an 
alternative asymmetric information hypothesis. 
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example, Buckley et al. (2007) find that the economics-based approach performs well in 
specifying the choice set of foreign investment projects to be considered, but that the final 
choice within this set is more difficult to explain with this approach. Hashai et al. (2010) test 
organizational learning theory (e.g. Cohen & Levinthal, 1990) versus internalization theory 
(along with Kogut and Zander’s (1993) theory) in explaining the diversity of foreign entry 
modes by MNEs. Hashai et al. (2010) in their analysis find support for the organizational 
learning perspective, rather than the TCE one.  
Overall, however, the example of IT/TCE-based IB research seems to us to suggest that like 
in the case of economics, Lakatos’ ideas are more applicable than those of Popper. While 
Buckley (1988) does not use Lakatos’ terms, the fact that the axioms are essentially 
irrefutable might justify an interpretation of IT in terms of an SRP. This is what Swaminathan 
(2007) lays out in the only previous attempt of which we are aware to identify Lakatosian IB 
SRPs. Specifically, Swaminathan (2007) argues that IT is a progressive (the word he uses is 
“thriving”) theoretical SRP in IB, while the “structural contingency theory” SRP is a 
degenerate one (he uses the word “declining”). What kind of SRP, then, is IT? Interestingly, 
Swaminathan  argues the hard core of IT is transaction cost economics (TCE) (Williamson, 
1975). Several comments can be made about this suggestion. First, it is interesting that this 
hard core makes no explicit reference to the international dimension (as is the case for 
Buckley’s (1988) axioms for IT). Indeed, the main interest of many internalization scholars 
has been the growth of the firm in general, not only qua MNE (e.g., Buckley & Casson, 1976). 
For example Hennart (1982, pp. 60-61) considers the theory as “perfectly general”, not 
distinguishing between “expansion of the firm within or across national boundaries”. In a 
Lakatosian interpretation, this means that any reference to the international dimension belongs 
in the protective belt, and thus is secondary and not essential to the theory. Some of the 
challenges for IB in developing a distinct identity might be related to the fact that according to 
one of its most influential perspectives, IT, international expansion is simply seen as a special 
case of a firm’s expansion. There is thus no link e.g. to the view of Grosse and Behrman 
(1992) that accounting for the effects of country borders and thus government policies is an 
important part of IB, and the view of Boddewyn that “[w]ithout political boundaries, there 
would be no international business” (1997, p. 56).   
Second, specifying TCE as the hard core of IT raises some interesting issues related to the 
definition of SRPs. In fact, it has been argued elsewhere that TCE (Williamson, 1975, 1979) 
is itself an SRP. Specifically, Knudsen (1993) argues that the hard core of TCE consists of the 
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assumptions of bounded rationality and opportunism, along with the assumption that 
governance structures are chosen to economize on transaction costs; while the protective belt 
includes the characteristics of transactions such as uncertainty and asset specificity 
influencing economic organization. Some IT scholars might object to Swaminathan’s (2007) 
view of the relationship between IT and TCE. For example, outlining the contributions of IB 
research to TCE, Hennart (2010) has argued that TCE is incomplete in the sense that it 
focuses too much on asset specificity for explaining the choice between internalization and 
licensing. Hennart argues that since licensing also would be expected to involve transaction-
specific investments, information asymmetry is a more compelling explanation for 
internalization. Still, according to Knudsen’s (1993) interpretation the contribution of IT, 
since it does not reject TCE’s hard core assumptions, still takes place in the protective belt.  
Whatever one’s view of the above issue, Swaminathan’s (2007) suggestion also raises the 
question of whether there are essentially SRPs at different levels; and, indeed, if we might go 
even further to explore the relationship of IT to economics. Now, IT/TCE is clearly distinct 
from the neoclassical economics SRP in the sense that it rejects core assumptions of 
neoclassical economic theory of the firm (Knudsen, 1993). Specifically, TCE makes two 
important modifications to the neoclassical assumptions (Williamson, 1975).23 First, bounded 
rationality represents a weakening of the rationality assumption, whereby actors are  
“intendedly rational” (Simon, 1961) but lack the ability to identify all possible contingencies, 
assign a probability to them, and process them for decision-making. 24  The opportunism 
postulate on its hand states that economic agents cannot be trusted to honour all agreements; 
thus departing from neoclassical economics where it is implicitly assumed that all “contracts” 
are kept or enforced. But what if both TCE and neoclassical economics are themselves part of 
the protective belt of a more general “economic approach” whose hard core consists of the 
minimal assumptions of maximization and equilibrium? Indeed, TCE has been cited as an 
example of economics modifying itself in response to criticism while retaining core 
                                                          
23 It does, however, retain the view of the firm as maximizing as a unitary actor. This contrasts with corporate 
governance theories allowing for the fact that firm decisions may not reflect profit maximization, but rather the 
motives of managers, etc. Hennart (1982) recognizes this and makes an argument for why transaction cost 
minimizing choices are nevertheless reasonable to assume. Our guess is that an emerging literature linking 
corporate governance and IB (Strange & Jackson, 2008), implicitly questioning the two axioms of Buckley 
(1988), will provide useful insights in the time to come. Besides this, it is worth pointing out that internalization 
and TCE are mainly concerned with comparative efficiency between institutional arrangements; however, as 
noted among others by Tomassen and Benito (2009) within a given governance structure there may still be 
significant differences in the actual governance costs incurred. The internalization decision thus arguably only 
tells part of the story about “maximization”. 
24 Again, it is useful to think in terms of maximization under constraints. In this case, the constraints include 
limited resources in terms of cognitive capacity, time for making decisions, etc. 
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assumptions (Buckley & Casson, 1993). In Fig. 1 below we suggest such a nested view of 
SRPs where the hard core of the “economic approach” is the assumptions of maximization 
and equilibrium (Buckley & Casson, 1993), while the derived SRPs of neoclassical 
economics and TCE respectively combine this assumption with different sets of auxiliary 
assumptions to form their own hard cores. By deriving progressively more fundamental 
assumptions, we find nested SRPs appearing as Russian Matryoshka dolls.  
 
Fig. 1. Nested scientific research programmes in economics. 
A discussion of economics-based IB research would not be complete without considering the 
OLI (Ownership-Location-Internalisation) paradigm developed by John Dunning over several 
decades (e.g. Dunning, 1980, 1988, 2000; Dunning & Lundan, 2008). Through this paradigm, 
Dunning attempted to pull together the different insights from the MNE literature into a 
coherent framework, positing three conditions for an FDI to take place. First, there must be 
Ownership advantages (O), firm-specific advantages that can compensate for the higher costs 
of operating abroad than at home. Second, there must be Location advantages (L) in the host 
country in question, providing an advantage of production there relative to production in the 
MNE’s home country. Third, there must be Internalization advantages (I) of keeping 
production within the firm’s boundaries, rather than relying on market transactions. It is 
obvious that given its generality, the OLI paradigm is difficult to falsify (Pedersen, 2003); and 
indeed “the OLI paradigm is not, and does not purport to be, a specific and testable theory of 
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the MNE” (Dunning & Lundan, 2008, p. 120). As Dunning and his associates point out, 
though the OLI paradigm itself is not testable, it offers a framework within which 
operationally testable theories can be developed. 
The OLI has been interpreted previously both in terms of a “theory”, a “framework” and a 
“paradigm” proper (Eden, 2003). We here investigate whether it can be given an 
interpretation in terms of ambitions to be an IB SRP. It might seem too “obvious” to label the 
work as a Kuhnian “paradigm” or normal science for IB scholars; though Dunning (2000) 
himself hints at this. It is worth noting, however, that the main “tenets” of the paradigm in 
terms of the O, L and I–advantages are indeed meant to constitute fundamental assumptions 
for IB research (they also include a specific reference to the international dimension, which, 
as we have seen above, is missing in IT). Indeed, although not using these terms, Dunning 
(2000, p. 169) appears to have a distinction between a hard core and a protective belt of the 
OLI in mind: 
The question at issue, then, is whether the changing character and boundaries of the O 
specific advantages of firms [see discussion below] can be satisfactorily incorporated 
into the eclectic paradigm, as it was first put forward. We would argue that as long as 
they do not undermine the basic tenets of the paradigm, and are not mutually 
inconsistent, they can be, although most certainly, they do require some modification 
to existing subparadigms and theories  
Here, Dunning in effect proposes that modifications can be made in the “protective belt” of 
the OLI paradigm, where we find the actual operational theories. Can we also assess the OLI 
in terms of Lakatos’ criteria for scientific progress? This would essentially involve showing 
the success of the theories in the protective belt, but building on the core OLI assumptions, in 
increasing empirical content over time. Though originally intended to explain international 
production, the OLI has later been extended to cover also other types of activities such as 
cooperative ventures that do not involve ownership (Pedersen, 2003). On the other hand, one 
might worry that the OLI framework might risk losing its coherence or internal consistency to 
the extent that it must be modified to accommodate these new phenomena. This is illustrated 
by the fact that the OLI has itself evolved over time: Indeed, five different versions or “marks” 
of the paradigm have been identified (Eden & Dai, 2010; Narula, 2010), which have grown in 
complexity, even leading some researchers using the OLI to prefer the earlier, simpler 
versions (Narula, 2010). Thus, Pedersen (2003, p. 20) notes that  
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The positive side of the change [from considering only international production to 
covering all value creating activities] is that the eclectic paradigm adds generality 
when other entry modes than FDI are taken into consideration. The downside is that 
OLI is assumed to explain just about anything by merely adding an extended set of 
variables. It seems reasonable to pose the question whether it explains all or nothing. 
While some of the changes in the OLI reflect changes in the world economy, others have 
arisen as a response to critics. One particularly notable criticism has come from 
internalization scholars arguing the O-component is superfluous. Buckley (1988, p. 182) 
argues that “if internalization is interpreted dynamically, the inclusion of ownership 
advantages is double counting”. The argument is that internalizing provides the firm with an 
advantage (i.e., an owner-specific advantage). Dunning and Lundan (2008, pp. 102-103) 
accept that from a dynamic perspective, the OLI components may be interdependent, but 
argue that it is still conceptually useful to consider them separately. In fact, Dunning (2000, p. 
167-168) argues that the increasing interdependence of the different components of the 
paradigm is a strength rather than a weakness: “the value of the eclectic paradigm has 
increased relative to the sum of its parts, with the contribution of each becoming increasingly 
interdependent of each other”. Other authors objected that some firms might go abroad 
precisely in order to obtain certain firm-specific advantages or assets (Mathews, 2002): This 
was later also acknowledged in the OLI, though Dunning maintained the importance of the 
assets that the firm possessed prior to internalization (Eden & Dai, 2010). 
Whether these and other modifications imply that there are in fact several OLI SRPs can be 
discussed. We would here, however, like to point out one final interesting characteristic of the 
OLI, which is its apparent ability to include many different research streams. Specifically, as 
its hard core assumptions are essentially stated as conditions (Boddewyn & Iyer, 1999) rather 
than as behavioural assumptions like in earlier reconstructions of SRPs in economics (Foss, 
1994; Knudsen, 1993), it can accommodate SRPs based, for example, on perfect rationality 
(neoclassical economics), bounded rationality (transaction cost economics) and rules-based 
“procedural” rationality (evolutionary economics) (Knudsen, 1993). Indeed, one might argue 
that the existence of such a framework in IB itself distinguishes it from “representative” 
economics research (that being said, it should be pointed out that even mainstream economics 
work on MNEs acknowledges the OLI as a “building block” for their analytical approach; see 
Barba Navaretti & Venables, 2004, p. 24). 
26 
 
26 
 
Modelling and scientific realism in IB research 
We now ask whether the generally greater focus of IB on descriptive realism implies a 
greater commitment to scientific realism. One could pursue two lines of argument. First, it 
could be argued that the sparser use of mathematical modelling and unrealistic assumptions 
itself reflects a reluctance to sacrifice empirical detail in order to construct a tractable 
mathematical model. However as we saw in the discussion of economics, the relationship 
between descriptive realism and scientific realism is not straightforward, and in any case IB 
works rarely motivate why mathematical modelling was not used. On the other hand, a view 
of models as idealizations are argued by some to be more closely linked to realism than one of 
models as pure constructions or “fictions”. Our approach here will therefore be to briefly 
discuss which of these two views of modelling appears to be predominant when IB scholars 
actually use mathematical models. Of course, such an analysis should only be regarded as 
suggestive, as it will largely rely on the language used by the authors. For example, Buckley 
and Casson’s (1976, pp. 62-65) model of “the growth of the research-intensive firm” is simply 
one in which their verbal analysis of “the aggressive phase of the research-intensive firm is 
summarised” (1976, p. 58). Rugman (1981, p. 53) does announce a more ambitious agenda by 
presenting different models or “methods of determination of the optimal modality” of 
servicing a given market, seeking to “provide as much information as possible so that a 
definitive model may emerge later from these pioneering efforts at formalizing the cost 
conditions affecting each modality.” As the field has matured, mathematical modelling has 
not diffused widely. However, of the two main categories of models discussed above, the 
“idealizing” view of models seems to predominate. For example, Buckley and Casson (2001) 
repeatedly motivate modelling choices with reference to “for simplicity” and the like. 
Similarly, Asmussen (2007, p. 93) notes that “[w]hile a formal model of the [integration-
responsiveness] framework can never replace the rich system description of the existing 
models, it can single out aspects of that system and show its mechanisms in a more 
operational way.”  Thus, to the extent that the stated “idealized” approach to models can be 
used as a proxy, we conclude that IB scholars do appear to lean towards scientific realism. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper has drawn upon the extensive efforts of philosophers of science in economics, to 
try and give tentative suggestions on the philosophy of science of economics-based IB 
research. In the spirit of economic analysis, we have made strong simplifications. We have 
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restricted the focus of the analysis to suit our specific purposes; limiting our discussion to the 
economics-based IB-program (internalization theory and the OLI paradigm) we have 
“assumed” away among others the important but elusive question of the boundaries of IB 
(Toyne & Nigh, 1997a). Nevertheless, through this limited analysis we have arrived at a 
number of tentative conclusions. First, although there is generally a stronger empirical focus 
in IB, it appears that like its ancestor, economics-based IB research is better understood in 
terms of Lakatos’ scientific research programmes (SRPs) than Popper’s falsificationism. 
Considering the nature of IB SRPs in turn gives some interesting results. First, we have 
pointed out that existing interpretations of the hard core of internalization theory do not 
contain an explicit reference to the international context; and that the theory can essentially be 
traced back to a more general economics paradigm, via modified sub-programmes such as 
transaction cost economics. On the other hand, discussing the currently “dominant analytical 
framework” (Dunning, 2000, p. 163), namely Dunning’s OLI paradigm, we identified some 
features which justifies an interpretation in terms of ambitions to be an IB SRP; such as a hard 
core consisting of core tenets (and also making explicit reference to the international context), 
and the suggestion that the paradigm can accommodate essentially most international features 
through an appropriate modification of the protective belt in terms of the specific theories 
accommodated within the paradigm. Another characteristic feature of the OLI paradigm is the 
openness to incorporate sub-SRPs based on different behavioural assumptions such as perfect 
rationality (neoclassical economics), bounded rationality (transaction cost economics) and 
rules-based “procedural” rationality (evolutionary economics) (Knudsen, 1993). Finally, 
exploring the link between (mathematical) models, unrealistic assumptions and scientific 
realism, we have suggested that the approach to models of IB scholars in most cases 
implicitly reflects a commitment to scientific realism.  
As for much economic analysis, a challenge is now to broaden our perspective and consider 
what the analysis has not captured. There are also other issues in the philosophy of science of 
economics which might be of interest for IB scholars besides those we have treated here. One 
such issue is the importance of quantitative statistical analysis in economics, and in IB. While 
we have here focussed on a relatively narrow set of economics-based studies, quantitative 
statistical analysis predominates in IB work more generally (Doz, 2011). Further work might 
for example consider the idea that qualitative analysis is “ideal” for falsificationism (Welch, 
Piekkari, Plakoyiannaki, & Paavilainen-Mäntymäki, 2010).  Another important question we 
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have neglected here is the debate on positive versus normative economics; i.e. whether it is 
possible to have a “value-free” economics (Blaug, 1980).  
Another topic which we have not treated, but which may become increasingly important in 
the philosophy of economics, is the implications of behavioural economics (Angner & 
Loewenstein, 2012), which has theorized and described a number of departures from standard 
assumptions on behaviour. One strand of research has demonstrated the importance of social 
preferences in terms of altruism and reciprocal behaviour, for example (Rabin, 1993). A 
second strand describes how actual decisions under uncertainty deviate from those prescribed 
by subjective expected utility theory. For example, rank-dependent utility implies that the 
attention given to an outcome depends not only on the probability of the outcome, but also on 
how favourable the outcome is compared to other outcomes (Diecidue & Wakker, 2001); 
while prospect theory holds that agents are loss averse as compared to risk averse (Kahneman 
& Tversky, 1979). Mainstream economics has long resisted the inclusion of such features in 
economic analysis, arguing that this would dilute the distinct strength of economics based on 
“rationality”. One may ask whether incorporating behavioural features strikes economics as 
its “Lakatosian core” of rationality, and whether behavioural economics is in this sense a new 
economics SRP. We limit ourselves to pointing out that “maximization” may be a more 
fungible concept than appears at first sight. Though relaxing assumptions on rationality, 
transaction cost economics  still assumes “intended rationality” and in particular a sufficient 
foresight of potential transaction cost issues leading to the design of efficient governance 
structures (Williamson, 1995). Similarly, incorporating behavioural features does not 
necessarily imply “irrationality”: The usefulness, in general, of the various heuristics as 
described above becomes more plausible when we allow that both mind and time are scarce 
resources in decision situations; cf. the idea of “maximization subject to constraints”. 
The debates presented here may also be useful in considering the future agenda of IB. For 
example, they may be useful for thinking about such issues as increasing the descriptive 
realism of IB research. Descriptive realism can be extended in various ways. One is greater 
realism in terms of the phenomena one seeks to explain. For example, some authors 
(Asmussen, et al., 2009; Benito, Petersen, & Welch, 2009) have called for recognition of the 
fact that actual foreign operation modes are more complex than most research assumes, and 
that the focus on specific mutually exclusive modes “stands in contrast to the variety of 
combined entry modes that can be observed in real-world firms” (Hashai, et al., 2010, p. 660). 
Extending existing theory (in particular internalization theory) to these relatively overlooked 
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aspects can also be seen as a way of further testing the theory. Other authors have called for 
greater realism in the assumptions regarding the explanatory factors. For example, Brouthers 
and Hennart (2007, p. 419) argue that  
the current focus on rational models of mode choice needs to be supplemented with 
more realistic [strategic decision making] perspectives that take into account the 
actions, beliefs, and attitudes of the managers who actually make these decisions and 
those external factors that influence managerial choices.  
As noted above, Friedman (1953/2008) argued that we should be concerned with the accuracy 
of predictions rather than greater descriptive realism in assumptions. However, incorporating 
so-called “behavioural features” has often led to improved predictions (Holden, 2012). 
Perhaps behavioural economics will in the years to come be one factor promoting the 
integration of the rational economics-based tradition and the “behavioural” tradition in IB.25 
So far, the dialogue between these streams has been relatively limited. However, some 
authors argue that the developments in behavioural economics may also affect the future 
application of economics to IB (Aharoni, et al., 2011); FDI studies utilizing these insights 
have already started to appear (Pinheiro-Alves, 2011). 
Though the aim of this paper has mainly been to investigate the philosophy of science 
implications of IB economics research practice, we would like to end on a more normative 
note. While there are limitations in principle to the practice of falsificationism, it is clear that 
IB researchers could in many cases do more to really put theories to the test. We have already 
mentioned the failure of many TCE-based studies to test the crucial interaction effect between 
uncertainty and asset specificity predicted by Williamson (1985) (and the failure of those that 
do so to problematize a lacking effect), but other examples could also be given. On the other 
hand, one welcome development in this respect is an increasing number of studies that 
attempt to combine different theoretical perspectives (e.g. evolutionary economics and 
transaction cost economics, both of which can be seen as SRPs in their own right). In these 
cases researchers may need to think about how they are setting these perspectives up against 
other or using them in a complementary manner. Interestingly, concepts from philosophy of 
science may also be helpful here; for example, identifying Lakatosian hard core assumptions 
of the different perspectives one attempts to combine could indicate whether there are 
                                                          
25 Though as Angner and Loewenstein (2012) point out, the relationship between older work such as that of 
Simon and the behavioural theory of the firm and modern behavioural economics is not straightforward. 
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inconsistencies in combining the theories (e.g. in terms of behavioural assumptions), and what 
are the implications of this.26 
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